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Principled Silence
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has drawn a line that
the state may not cross in its treatment of gay people. In Romer v. Evans, 1 the
Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of Amendment 2 to the
Colorado State Constitution, which categorically prohibited gay people from
obtaining legal protection from discrimination based on their sexual
orientation .2 The Colorado Supreme Court had held that the right to
participate in the political process, with which the amendment clearly
interfered, was a fundamental right requiring strict judicial scrutiny, and that
the amendment failed that test. 3 The U.S . Supreme Court affirmed on different
grounds. Writing for a six-member majority, and g iv ing sh ort shrift to a
vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy held that Amendment 2
was repugnant to the spirit of the Equal Protecti on Cl ause. The Co urt depl oye d
its mo st deferential standard and found that "Amendment 2 fai Is, ev en defi es,
this conventional inquiry ... ; it lacks a rational rel ationship to legitimate state
interests." 4 The majority thereby answered a qu estion that the Court had left
open in its decision in Bowers v. Hardwick: 5 Can the Equal Protection Clause
ever be used to strike down anti-gay legislation ? In the ten years between
Bowers and Romer, only one court of appeals had found room for gay people
inside the Equal Protection Clause. Its insistence, now vindi cated, that the

I. 11 6 S. C t. 1620 ( 1996).
2. T he parties and the Court ado pted the na me "A me ndme nt 2"- the titl e unde r w hic h the am endme nt
was submirted to Colorado voters-for ease of re ferenc e. See id. at 1623 . Ame ndme nt 2 reads, in full :
No Protected Status Based o n Ho mosexua l, Lesbian, o r Bisexua l Orie nta tio n. Nei the r the State
of Co lorado, throug h any of its bra nches or depa rtments, nor any o f its agenc ies , po litical
s ubdivisi ons, muni c ipal iti es or sch ool di st ric ts, sha ll enact, adopt or enforce a ny statute,
regulati on, o rd inance o r po licy w he reby ho mose xua l, lesbia n o r bisex ual o ri entat io n, cond uct ,
practices o r relati onships s hall con stitute o r othe rwise be the bas is of or entitl e a ny perso n or
cl ass o f perso ns to have o r c laim any minority status, quo ta pre fere nces, pro tected status o r
cl aim of d isc rimin ation. Thi s Secti on o f the Consti tuti on shall be in a ll respec ts se lf-execu ting.
CO LO. CON ST. art. 2, § 30b.
3. See Evans v. Ro mer, 882 P.2d 133 5 (Co lo. 1994) (en bane).
4. Romer, 11 6 S. Ct. at 1627.
5. 478 U.S . 186 ( 19 86). Bo wers he ld tha t a Geo rg ia sta tute proh ibit in g oral o r a nal sex between
co nsenti ng adul ts did not vio late the Due Process Clause whe n a pplied to ho mosexua ls. See id. a t 189. The
Co urt's previous decisi o ns in Griswold v. Conneclicu/, 381 U. S. 479 ( 1965), a nd Eisensladi v. S aini, 40 5
U.S. 43 8 ( 1972 ), suggested that, if appl ied to heterose xuals, the statut e wou ld not have passed co ns ti tut io na l
mu ster- a po in t Georg ia co nceded . See Bowers,478 U.S. at 2 18 n. IO (Stevens, J. , di ssen tin g). T he Cou rt
did not address that que stion, see id. at 188 n.2 , nor any c laim of equa l protecti on, see id. at 196 n. S.
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equa l protection and due process claims of gay litigants are analytically distinct
remained for years as a lone voice amidst an unsympathetic, hostile throng. 6
Romer is the seminal decision in the jurisprudence of equal protection for
gay people. As such, it is the beginning of a story, not the end. This Case Note
argues that Justice Kennedy's carefully crafted opinion foreshadows chapters
in that story that have yet to be written, shedding light on an issue that Romer
ultimately leaves unresolv ed: Do gay people constitute a suspect class that
merits heightened judicial protection? The Romer Court had two distinct
ana lytical models upon which to draw, following its two landmark rational
rev iew cases: an open-ended analysis grounded in principle, as exemplified by
Reed v. Reec/, 7 or an exhaustive analysis grounded in fact, as exemplified by
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente1; Inc. 8 It chose the fanner,
speaking not at all to the factual record on which the lower court had rested
its decision. That silence carries a message-one that betokens a shift in the
att itude of the Court toward the claims of gay litigants and casts the more
strident portions of Justice Scalia's dissent as a harsh counterpo int to its subtle
theme. To hear this message properly requires attention to context- its absence
in the majority opinion, and its use in th e dissent.
The Romer maj ority introduces its analysi s with the proposition that
evaluating the merits of an equal protection claim always depends upon
" knowing the relation between the ciassification adopted and the object to be
atta ined ."9 T hose laws that the Court has uph e ld against rational basis
challenges, it reminds us, have been "narrow enough in scope and grounded
in a suffici ent factual context for [the Co urt] to ascerta in that there existed
so me relat ion between the classification and th e purpose it served. " 10 But the
majority opinion is remarkably devoid of any di scuss ion of the particular traits
th at serve to define gay people as a c lass . 11 Rather, the majority concludes

6. The op in io n was written by Jud ge William 1\. Norris o f the Ninth C ircuit Court of Appeal s.
Compwc Watkins v. United States Arm y, 847 F.2d 1329, I J-10 (9th Ci r. 1988), ,·acared a11<l cJf'd 0 11 other
grounds, 875 1-.2d 699 (9t h Ci r. 1989) (e n bane) ("'[N ]ot hing in Haniwick suggests that the state may
penalize gay s for their sexual o rientation. . . We cannot read Hw d~< ·ic k as standing fo r the proposit ion rh"t
go ve rnment may o utlaw sodomy only when committed by a disfav ored class o f perso ns.''). ll'ith id. at 135 5
(Rei nhardt, J. , d issentin g) ("The anti-homosexual th rust of Hwrhrick, and the Cou rt's w ill ingness to
•.:ondone anti-homosexua l animu s in the actions of the gove rnm en t. 3rc clear:''). and, e.g .. Ben-Shal om v.
[vlars h, 881 F2d 454, 464-66 (7t h Cir. I 989) (rejecting Judge No rri s's analy s is).
7. 404 U. S. 71 (1971).
8. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
9 . Romer, 11 6 S. Ct. at 1627.

10. Jd.
II. Richard Ev ans lev ied a facial chal lenge against Amendment 2. See id at 1632 (Sca lia, J.,
dis se nting). A co urt necessar ily conducts its analysi s of such a chal le nge on a more gen eral ized level , as
'·the ch allenger must establi sh that no set of circum stances exist s unde r wh ich the Ac t wou ld be valid ."
Un ikd Stares v. Sale rno , 48 1 U.S . 739, 745 ( I 987). But the differe nce concerns the type o f facts that are
relevant, not rhe relevanc e o f facts at all. A facial cha llenge to a restriction requ ires an inquiry into th e
relatio nship betwee n the restrictio n and the class rather than the res triction and the individual litigant. See.
q.g., Lindsey v. No rme t, -105 U. S 56 , 64-79 (1972) (s triking dow n po rti ons of O reg o n landlord/tenant
starute based on E~cii.! l challenge and res ting dec isio n on charJcteristics of 13ndlord and tenant c lasses).
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that no factual context could ever support a c lass ification of such "sheer
breadth" as Amendment 2. 12 B ut this bol d statemen t of principle, w hen
considered in isolation from the nature of gay people's class statu s and the
di scriminari on levi ed against them, seems discontinuous with the Co urt's
prev ious equal protection jurisprudence. Class ifications of ri ghts and privileges
based on age, for example, exhi bit extraord inary breadth in this country:
Young peop le are catego ricall y excluded from participating in the political
process, voting, and serving on juries, and old er Americans are excluded from
the private and public sectors al ike through mandatory retirement ages. Yet the
Suprem e Court has upheld such broad cl ass ificat ions on a rational basis
theory 13 by adverting to tho se " distinguishing ch aracteristics [of di fferent age
groups] re levant to interests the State has the authority to implement," 14 and
to our common interest, as people who age, in protecting both the young and
the old. 15 Sim ilarly, in Romer, it seems to be the combi nation of the breadth
of Amen dm ent 2, the nature of the classificatio n, and the identity of its target
th at so offends the Constituti on. On thi s comb inatio n of fa ctors, however; th e
m ajo rity is silent.

12. Rumer. 116 S. Ct. at ! 627. The majo rity offers an alternati ve expl anati on for its result. Obse rvi r. ~
that Amendment 2 "impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated di sability o n a :; ingle named group," it op ine s
th at "[a ] law dec laring that in gen~ral it shall be more d iffic ult for one group of citizens than for ail others
to see k aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal se nse. "
id. at i 627- 23. i\ bri ef tiled by Professors Laurence Tri be , John Hart Ely, Ge ra ld Gunther, Philip Kur land ,
and k athlee n Sull ivan, which desc ribes Amendment 2 as a "per sc violati on o f the Equa l Protectio n
Clause:' rnay have in flue nc ed this lang uage. 8ri~ f or LJu ren ce H. Tribe, et al.. JS Arnici C uri ae in Sup port
of Res pondents at 3, Ro mer v. Evili1S, 116 S. Ct. ! 620 ( ! 996) (No. 9-! ·1 03 9). However. the Tribe brief rests
its :.1rg umcnt Oil 3 reading of ,LI,mendmcnt 2 th ~ll precludes hOI110St'XUU[ity ['rom ··be in g made the basis for
an y prokction pursuant to lhe 5l~11r.: ·s h:ws from ~ny instance of d iscr im in:::tion. however inv iJious (lnd
un wJ. rrantcd,'' icl.-th at i:; , on-;: th at exempts gay peop le eve n from rati onal bas is rev ie\\~ The Court
acknowledges that such a rc:.H.! ing is poss ibk but find s it unnecessa ry to its disposit io n o f the ca::;e. See
Rom:.:r. 116 S. Ct. at ! 626 ("I~ is :} fa ir. if ~iGt JJCc•=ssary. infen: nce.
that [tile amc ndrn cntl dcp ri vl: s gay s
:l!ld k::;h ians ev en of the prot e;.; t\u1~ of St !~er ~d b'.VS and pol ici..:-s thai prohibit arbitrary discrimination
Th ~ sta~e court diJ not deci.J:= \\'hdil·.::r ih \~ Gmend rnt:nt has this effect. howevc1~ und neither need wt;. :').
f,,lon:·o ver, lh c i1i ujo riry itself 3 l:~gc sis a more ap prop ri 1tc C(Jntcxt \\·ithi n \\'hi ch to re:.±d it.:s a!krn:.nivc
explana!ion- tht Court \ r·~jectio n of segregation and :5e(:o nd -c lass citizenship in Brown 1: Board .. ~ (
Education. 347 U.S. 4~L) (195-~.L The maj ority's j udg men t that Amendmen t 2 is a ' 'd eni~1 l of eq ua l
pi·otcct io n ... in t h~ most liter<.: ! se nse,'' Ro;ner, \ l6 S. Ct. at 1623, and her~ cc not amenable i.o the type
of ba iancing normail y required by the ~~.J~lal ?rottr.t ion C lau se, ec hoe s :ts hoid i!1g in Bruwn tint "'[s] epa rat e
t~duca ti on~:!l faciiities ore inherenrl y un=.:quaL" Bru:,·n. 3...;.7 U.S. ar 495. Likcwis•: . tl:e Ro,n..:r majority's
admonition that •·[i]t is not '}.:ith in our cv!1 sti tL:ti onai tt::td iti,_::,n to C!13Ct L-!\V S of thi s so rt, " Ronu..•r, 116 S. Ct.
at 1628. is p o\V'~rful ly evo;.;rrtiv -:: of th e Co un ·s judgn-:ent in Bolling '-: Sharpe, 3-i/ U.S. -} 97 ( 1954 ). t h~
companion case ~o BnJit?7. that "[cjlassiRcations based sol el y upon rac e.
an: 1:ontrary to our tradition s
an d hence con st itution al ly susp~:~ct. : · /d. ;;~t 499. The Romer majority clearly invites the comparison \Vith
Brown and Balling: It opens !ts opinion ;,o,·ith Justice Ha rlan's ringing di ssent in P!es.\y v Fe rxusun ~ 163
U.S. 537 (I 896), (he· cwse that Broll 'n r':_i -=:ckJ>and ccnsp icuous ly cites to SH 'UJff t Painter , 339 U.S. 6:29
{_1950), one of il!tHt·n's proge nli:..;rs . for a pi·Gposit~<:i1 0f !:.:t w that origina:ed, not in .)~wean. but in Shei!ey
:-: Kranli;r, 33--J. U.S . i ( 19~ 8 ). S[!i.! RcJ.':t er. l !S ~.C t..~[ 1623, \6 28 (' " Equal proti.!C ti on of th e Lnvs is not
achit:ve:d thro ugh indi scr imin ~:c imposit ion cr if! equ~l l it! cs.'. ') (quoting s\I 'Cllll, 339 U.S. at 635 (quo li ng
Shelley, 33-l US. at 22)) .
13. 3~:e fVlass :-tchuse ns BJ. of i\e:ti re:::•::m '>'. iV!ti~gi 3. ~~27 U.S. 307 ( i 976 ) (app lying r:1 tiona l b3sis
anal sis to age discrimino.tion:l.
-L Cleburne v. Cl~bu r nc Li \· ~ng C~r.. l:-Jc .. 473 U.S. -f32. -~ ~! ( 193:5 ) (discu ss in:; Afwgio).
5. 5:ee .\!urgia _ ~LZ7 U.S. 2.~ 3i3 ~ !4 .
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Such reticence calls to mind the Court's opinion in Reed v. Reed.
There, parties to a probate action challenged an Idaho statute giving men an
17
automatic prefe renc e over women for appointment as estate administrators.
The Court struck down th e statute-the first tim e it had inv a lidated a law on
the basis of sex di scri mination- holding insufficient the State's interests in
admini strative efficiency and the reduction of intrafamil y controversy. 18 As
in Romer, the Court employed a rational basis test; 19 and, as in Romer, th e
Court did not engage in a particulari zed analysi s of th e classification, despite
a clearly hostile precedent" 0 and despite the Idaho leg islature's finding that
" in general men are better qualified to act as an administrato r than are
wo men ." 2 1 Rather, Reed's holding was briefly stated and broadly worded: "To
give a mandatory preference to members of either sex ove r m embers o f the
other, merely to accompli sh the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to
make th e very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause . . . . " 22 Thus, the decision in Reed was extremely openend ed. While the Co urt took no position on heightened scrutiny for sex
di scrimination / 3 it a lso prov ided no fact-based analys is th at could have lent
supp ort to a fut ure determ ination that a gend er class ificati on was, in fact,
rationall y related to a leg itimate end .
Reed is now rec ogni zed as the case th at ush ered in the era of heighten ed
scrutiny for gender discrimination 24 As Justice Ginsb urg wrote in th e VMI
case, "[s]ince Reed, the Court has repeatedly reco gni zed that neither fe dera l
nor state govemment acts compatibly with the equa l protection princ ipl e when
a law or o ffici a l poli cy den ies to women, simpl y because th ey are women, full
c iti zenship stature." 25 Reed's open -ended , principled stru cture signal ed th e
16. 404 U.S. 71 ( 1971).
17. Seeid.at71 - 72.
18. See id. at 76-77.
19. See id. at 76 ('"Th e questio n prese nted.
is whe th e r a di ffe renc e in the sex of com pe t ing
applicants ... bears a rational relationsh ip to a state objective .... " ).
20. See Goesaert v. C leary, 335 U.S. 464,465 - 66 ( 1948) (uphold in g Mich igan's right to draw " a sharp
line bet ween the sexes'' and to for bid women to work as ba rtenders). Th e Reed Court declined even to cite
Goesaert,ju st as the Romer majo rit y refused to d iscuss Bo\l'ers. As in Reed, the Romer majo rity's refu sal
to acknowledg e hosti le precede nt may call into ques tion th at precedents continuing vitality. Co mpw~
Nab ozny v. Pod lesny, No. 95 -3634 , 1996 U.S . A pp. LEX IS 18 866 . at *33 n.l2 (7th Cir. Jul y 31, 1996)
("Of co urse, Bowers will soo n be ec lipsed in the area of equa l pro tecti on by the Su preme Court 's hold ing
in Romer " Evans.") (ci tatio n omitted). with B en-S hal om v. i'vl ars h, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th C ir. 19 89)
("Althoug h the [Bowers ] Court ana lyzed th e constitutiona lity of the statute [before it) o n a due proc ess
rather tha n equa l protection basi s, Han/wick ne vert hele ss impacts o n the sc rutin y aspects under a n equ al
protection a nalysi s."), and Romer v. Evan s, 116 S. Ct. 1620. 1629, 163 1- 33 ( 1996) (Sca li a, J. , dissenting)
(arguing tha t Romer hol d ing ·'con trad icts" Bowers ho ld ing and that decisions cannot be reco nc il ed) .
21. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635. 638 (Idaho 1970).
22 . Reed v. Reed, 404 U S 71, 76-77 ( 1971 ).
23. The Idaho Supreme Court had made no ruli ng on the issue . See Reed, 465 P.2d a t 635. S imil arly,
in Rom er, th e state tria l court reje cted the c la im that gay peop le co nstitute a suspec t c lass, an d the plainti ITs
elected not to appeal the ru li ng. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 133 5, 1341 n.3 (Co lo. 1994) (en bane).
24. See, e.g., Crai g v. Boren. 429 U.S . 190 , 197- 98 ( 1976) (ide ntifyi ng Re ed as progenitor of cases
applying hei g hten ed sc rutiny to gender di sc riminati o n).
25. Un ited States v. Vi rgin ia, 116 S. Ct. 2264. 2275 ( 1996).

-------------------------~
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Co urt's awaren ess of women's need for constitutional protection and set the
stage for a later, explicit adoption of a hei ghtened standard of review.
The language and analytical structure of Reed and Romer, and the
su bsequent hi sto ry of Reed, stand in sharp contrast to the Court's other
landmark rational basis opinion, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
In c. 26 In Cleburne, the plaintiffs challenged a zoning ordinance that gave
di sfavored treatment to the mentally retarded. On revievv, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted them relief, holding that the mentall y retarded
constitute a quasi-suspect class calling for a heightened standard of judicial
review, a standard the ordinance failed to satisfy.27 The Supreme Court, per
Justice White, affirmed the Fifth Circuit 's resu lt on different grounds: It
rejected any heightened standard of protection for the mentall y retard ed but
found that th e ordinance could not survive even rational basis scrutin y. 28
The majority grounds each stage of its analysis in Cleb urne in a highly
particu lari zed discussion of the class of mentally retarded people and th e Texas
ordinance th at operated to their detriment. First, in rej ecting the application of
heightened scrutiny, the Court investigates the definiti on of mental retard ation
and the problems that attend its treatment, th e avenues for legal reli ef already
available to the mentally retarded, and th e sympathetic rep resentation that the
group receives in the political process. 29 Then, in find ing that the zon ing
ordinance nonetheless fail s rational basis scrutin y, it analyzes with particul arity
the stated purposes of th e legislature, exp laining why th ey fail to save the
ordinance. 30 Unlike its opini ons in Reed and Romer, th e Cleburne Co urt's
exhaustive factu al analysis leaves no room for subsequent liti gants to shift the
analytica l paradi gm with evidence of their disfavored class status.
Indeed , the Cleb urne majority reach es out to forec lose any avenu e shot1
of outright reversal for according heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded.
As Justice Marshall points out in his di sse nt, "because th e Court invalidates
Cleb urne's zo nin g ordinance on ration al basis grounds, the Court's wideranging di scussion of hei ghtened scrutiny is wholl y superflu ous to th e deci sion
of this case." 31 Apparentl y recognizing that future co urts might take hi s
invalidation of the Cleburne ordinance as a step toward heightened scrutiny,
Justice White abandons judicial restraint and engages the issue .
Such restrictive overreaching is entirely abse nt from both Reed and Romer.
In Reed, th e Court declin es to address the State's contention that men are more
qua lified th an wo men to ad minister estates 32 In Romer, the Cout1 bare ly

26.
27.
28.
29.

4 73 U.S. 432 ( 1985).
See Cleburne Li v ing Ctr. , Inc. v. Ci ty of C leb urne, 726 F.2d 191 (5 th Ci r. 1984).
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435,442, 447-4 8.
See id at 442-46 & 442 n.9.
30 . See id at 44 7-50.
3 1. Id at 456 (;'vlarsh all, L di ssenti ng).
32 See Reed v. Reed. 404 US. 7 1. 75- 77 (197 1).
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mentions Colorado's asserted interests in prioritizing discrimination claims,
33
protecting intimate assoc iation, an d discouraging politic a l factionalism T he
Romer Co urt also leaves unexam ined the question of w hether politic al
34
participation constitutes a fundamental right, an inquiry that would require
a di sc us sion as to whether the denial of that right only to gay p eople is, or is
not, con stitutional. Romer tracks Reed, rather than Cleburne, empl oy in g a
rational basis review that would be entirel y consistent with a fu ture
determination that gay people require hei ghten edjudici a l pro te ction.
Justice Scalia 's extraordi nary di ssent in Romer takes on a more definite
shape in light of the fo regoing an a lysi s. Th e Ju sti ce refers to gay litigants' civil
rights struggle as a "Kulturkampf," an assault upon the "traditional sexual
mores" of " tolerant" commonfolk. 35 Homosexu a ls, he w rites, are a
" geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority" with "high
disposabl e in come" who have successfull y aligned themselves with an el ite
"lawyer c lass," th e "knights rather than the villeins," " Templars" w ho hav e
betrayed the more "plebeian attitudes" of true citizens. 36
When a Supreme Co urt Ju stice authors a dissent that uses such lang uage
to describ e the patiies req uesti ng re lief, 37 we mu st strive to un derstan d the
impetus behind hi s word s. In Rom er, Justi ce Scalia's impetu s was the neeQ.Jo
respond to th e majority's careful ly schooled, suggestive s ile nce. The trad itional
test fo r a discrete and insular minority meriting he ightened judi cia l scrutiny
requires, inter al ia, a sh owing th at the group is unable to find protection in the
po li tical process.38 T here are strong arguments supporting the conc lu sio n that
gay people satisfy t hi s requ irem ent 3 9 Justice Kennedy do es not engage these
arguments at all, however, causing Ju sti ce Sca li a's diatrib e in seeming res ponse
to them to appear, at first blush, li ke gratui tous shadow-b oxing . B ut it is
Romer's very silence on the question of heightened scrutiny, an d on the factual
inqu iries that m ight eventu all y support its app li cati on , that inspires Justice
Sca li a to such rheto rica l depths. As Reed lc Reed de monstra tes , s ilence, w hen
prop erly deployed , can testify to a fun damental shift in the Co.trt's attitude
toward di scrimin ation against a d is favored group. Justice Ken nedy's op in io n
suggests that anothe r such shift may have occurred.
- Tobias Barrington i;VoUJ
~o. Se e Romer v. Ev ans. 116 S. C t. 1620, i 629 ( !996).
34. But se e Romer, 116 S. C t. at 1628 (opi nin g that '·governm ent and each of it s parts [should) rema in
open on imparti:.d te rms to al! who seek its ass istance.").
35. Id. at l 629 (Scali a, J., dissenting).
36. id at 1634-37.
37. Lj. Akhi! Reed Amai, A!la inder a nd .-1meil dm enl 2: Rom ed· Rig htn ess , 94 ~;l!Cl!. L. RE v .
(fort hco ming Oct. 1'196) (man uscri pt at 30 &. n. l 38, on tile w iih the lilie Lo w Jowna/) (d isc uss ing
overto nes of di ssen' ·. ,·ith refe re nce to perse c ution of gay s and Jcv,s during Wo r!d War II ).
38 . Se e. c g. Fro nt icro v. Ric hardso n .'~!! U. S 677. 685-86 & nn. l 4 & 17 (1 9 73 ).
39 . See, t!. g. ~ Kenji Yoshino. Susp ect Symbols: T fu: Lirerary Arg ument .for /{ eighte ned Sc.:ruiinyfo;·
Gavs , 96 C Ol.Uo!. L. REV . (to nhcoming N o v. 1996 ) (ma nuscript at 57-92, on fi le w ith <he ]2;/e Law
Jo urr:af) (di sc ussi ng disadvantages gays fa ce in fi nding sympathet ic repres~ n ta tion in pol itic:.J. l process) .

